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GREATER UNIFORMITY AND CENTRALIZATION:
THE REGULATORY DEVELOPMENT
OF CHINESE FOOD AND PRODUCT SAFETY
UNDER THE WTO
Nga Kit ‘Christy’ Tang
Abstract: The WTO Agreements emphasize free trade, which links with diversity,
deregulation, and decentralization. China, on the other hand, emphasizes uniformity and
centralization, especially regarding the political control and the one-party system of
“democratic dictatorship.” China’s joining the WTO, therefore, may be considered as a
development that changes the regulatory structure to become more diverse, deregulated,
and decentralized. This paper, however, finds the opposite. Under the WTO law, China is
encouraged to move towards greater uniformity and centralization with its decentralized
and non-uniform settings under the market policy. Moreover, the WTO’s uniform and
centralized encouragements can be integrated into the rule-by-man framework to increase
the administrative and economic power of the Party. It is thus unclear whether China’s
food and product safety problem can be solved.
Cite as: Nga Kit ‘Christy’ Tang, Greater Uniformity and Centralization: The Regulatory
Development of Chinese Food and Product Safety Under the WTO, 28 WASH. INT’L L.J.
65 (2019).

I.

INTRODUCTION

The World Trade Organization (WTO) promotes free trade, which is
often considered as enhancing diversity, deregulation, and decentralization.
China, on the other hand, emphasizes the one-party system embracing
uniformity and centralization, particularly with regards to political control
over words, thoughts, and action, as well as economic control under
communist-capitalist, or bureaucratic-capitalist, policies. 1 When China
became a WTO member in 2001, it appeared to be part of a liberalization
process that would lead the country to be more diverse, deregulated, and
decentralized. This paper, however, finds the opposite, particularly
concerning the Chinese government administration’s role in the food and
product safety system.



S.J.D. (Doctor of Juridical Science), LL.M., American University Washington College of Law;
LL.M. with Distinction, City University of Hong Kong; LL.B., University of London; M.B.A., University of
Leicester; B.A., The Chinese University of Hong Kong. Tang is a registered attorney in the State of New
York. I am deeply indebted to Professors Padideh Ala’i and Jeffrey S. Lubbers at American University
Washington College of Law for their insightful comments. All errors are mine. E-mail address:
christynktang@gmail.com.
1
Maurice Meisner, THE DENG XIAOPING ERA: AN INQUIRY INTO THE FATE OF CHINESE
SOCIALISM,1978–94 passim (1996).
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In light of the one-party system of political uniformity and
centralization, Communist China has ironically relied on a flexible and
decentralized market policy to pursue economic growth.2 In the context of
food and product safety, this flexibility and decentralization presents in
different forms in terms of standardization, administrative, and legal measures,
which mainly rely on ex post remedies of private law. This governance
structure can also be viewed as a self-regulated laissez-faire system that is
monitored by nearly three thousand local governments at the county levels
through rulemakers, regulators, and economic developers that are closely
connected with the industry in various regions.3
By contrast, as a WTO Member, China is encouraged—or obliged—to
develop a regulatory system that is more uniform and centralized. Uniformity
arises in two facets. One direction is the transparency principle that requires a
“uniform, impartial and reasonable” application of rules under the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) 4 and “uniform administration”
under the Protocol on the Accession of the People’s Republic of China (China
Protocol).5 These uniformities, however, can be based on unwritten concepts,
such as reasonableness and fairness, as well as written definitions regarding
administrative action.
Another uniformity direction concerns the international harmonization
of safety standards. These standards provide written substantive rules that are
closely related to scientific evidence directed and supported by recognized
experts and authorities.6 Both uniformity directions under transparency and
harmonization require centralized settings, which rely on the central roles of
the WTO’s dispute mechanism and designated organizations at the
international level, as well as the central government at the national level to
ensure conformity.

2
Nga Kit ‘Christy’ Tang, China v. China: The Paradox in Regulating Food and Product Safety 211–
306 (May 9, 2014) (S.J.D. dissertation, American University) (on file with Pence Library, American
University), available at: https://auislandora.wrlc.org/islandora/object/thesesdissertations:336 [hereinafter
Tang, China v. China].
3
Id.
4
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing
the World Trade Organization, Annex 1A, 1867 U.N.T.S. 187, 33 I.L.M. 1153 (1994) [hereinafter GATT
1994].
5
Accession of the People’s Republic of China, Nov. 10, 2001, WT/L/432 [hereinafter China Protocol].
6
Sam F. Halabi, The Codex Alimentarius Commission, Corporate Influence, and International Trade:
A Perspective on FDA’s Global Role, 41 AM. J.L. & MED. 406, 417 (2015) [hereinafter Halabi]; THE ROLE
OF ‘EXPERTS’ IN INTERNATIONAL AND EUROPEAN DECISION MAKING PROCESSES: ADVISORS, DECISION
MAKERS OR IRRELEVANT ACTORS? 194 (Monika Ambrus et al. eds., 2014).
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The WTO’s uniformity and centralization goals seem to stem from the
Western rule of law tradition to pursue certainty, consistency, and
predictability. Considering the function of WTO law, uniformity in the forms
of harmonization and transparency can be a means to eliminate unnecessary
trade barriers, as well as arbitrary and unjustifiable discrimination, with the
goal to promote free trade that encourages equality and fairness. When this
view of equality, or non-discrimination, combines with the preventive
approach that enhances the role of governments to protect people from
harmful food and products, national administrations can be encouraged, or
obliged, to regulate, direct, or supervise economic activities.
In China, this safety and free trade development regarding uniformity
and centralization may strengthen the economic role of the central
government. Besides the political control, the Communist Party can be
encouraged, or obliged, to have regulatory and economic power centralized
and uniform when supervising food and merchandise production. Without a
rule of law, the Chinese food and product safety development can ironically
be a domestic deliberalization process under the WTO’s international
liberalization. Moreover, it is unclear if the safety problems can be solved.
This paper aims to examine the impact of the WTO’s pursuit of uniform
and centralized regulations on China. The study is divided into five sections.
After this introductory section, the second section reviews the WTO’s
uniformity and centralization provisions under the principles of transparency
and harmonization.7 The third section examines how the Chinese food and
product safety regulatory system rely on flexibility, decentralization, and selfregulation. The fourth section discusses Chinese developments in uniformity
and centralization that embrace greater administrative, information, and
economic control by the central government. The fifth section concludes that
the international free trade development under WTO law can be used to
strengthen the “full process control” of the Party in China.
THE WTO’S CENTRALIZED UNIFORMITY

II.

The WTO Agreements—generally referred to as the Final Act—are a
As discussed in Part I, Section C and D, the “encouragements” under the SPS and TBT Agreements
may refer to voluntary standards that can be transformed to be mandatory obligations in practice. Thus, the
word of “encouragement” might only be half-accurate. The use of this word “encouragements” follows the
WTO’s official website such as Understanding the WTO Agreements on Sanitary and Phytosanitary
Measures, WTO (May 1998), https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/sps_e/spsund_e.htm.
7
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series of rules that were agreed to at resulting the 1986–1994 Uruguay Round
of multilateral trade negotiations.8 These agreements are legal texts that spell
out the principles of liberalization.9 The aim, as provided by the WTO, is to
combat discrimination and unnecessary obstacles to trade, as well as to create
a predictable trading environment.10 Applying this framework to international
food and product safety, however, can actually lead to greater uniformity and
centralization of deliberalization.11
These uniform and centralized characteristics are presented in various
forms. This section, in particular, focuses on four WTO Agreements. First,
the GATT, which provides the fundamental principles regarding “uniform,
impartial and reasonable manner.”12 Second, the China Protocol, which lays
down specific obligations requiring “uniform administration.” 13 Third and
fourth are the Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT Agreement)
and the Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary
Measures (SPS Agreement), which both concern substantive safety standards.
A.

GATT’s “Uniform, Impartial and Reasonable Manner” of Rule
Application

WTO law requires uniform application of trade measures, which
mainly concerns administrative action regarding how government officials
should apply substantive rule. In particular, under the transparency principle,
Article X:3(a) of the GATT states that “each contracting party shall administer
in a uniform, impartial and reasonable manner all its laws, regulations,
decisions and rulings of the kind described in paragraph 1 of this Article.”14

8

WTO, Legal Texts: The WTO Agreements, WTO, https://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/
final_e.htm (last visited Nov. 28, 2018); WTO, Overview: A Navigational Guide, WTO, [hereinafter WTO,
A Navigational Guide], https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/agrm1_e.htm (last visited Nov.
28, 2018).
9
WTO, A Navigational Guide, supra note 8.
10
Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade, 1868 U.N.T.S. 120, [hereinafter TBT],
https://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/17-tbt.pdf.
11
Robert L. Howse et al., Pluralism in Practice: Moral Legislation and the Law of the WTO After Seal
Products, 48 GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV. 81, 135 (2015) [hereinafter Pluralism in Practice]; Halabi, supra
note 6, at 407. Uniformity may refer to the application of trade measures under the transparency principle
and the encouragement of domestic measures to be based on international standards under harmonization.
Centralization functions as a means to unify such applications and standards through the central government
at the national level and the WTO at the international level.
12
GATT 1994, supra note 4, art. X:3(a).
13
China Protocol, supra note 5, pt. I § 2(A).
14
GATT 1994, supra note 4, art. X:3(a).
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Paragraph 1, Article X:1 of the GATT, provides details regarding the
scope of those trade measures that shall be applied in a “uniform, impartial
and reasonable manner,” which include:
Laws, regulations, judicial decisions and administrative rulings
of general application, made effective by any contracting party,
pertaining to the classification or the valuation of products of
customs purposes, or to rates of duty, taxes or other charges, or
to requirements, restrictions or prohibitions on imports or exports
or on the transfer of payments therefor, or affecting their sale,
distribution, transportation, insurance, warehousing inspection,
exhibition, processing, mixing or other use . . . [as well as]
[a]greements affecting international trade policy which are in
force between the government or a governmental agency of any
contracting party and the government or governmental agency of
any other contracting party . . . .15
Such trade measures include: (1) statutes written by the legislature, (2)
regulations written by agencies, (3) judicial decisions written by judges, and
(4) administrative rulings written by administrative courts regarding customs,
imports and exports, and transfer of payments, as well as (5) any policies
determined by executive functions that may affect movement of goods. Thus,
both legal rules and policies in the forms of trade or domestic measures that
directly or indirectly affect international trade shall be applied in a “uniform,
impartial and reasonable manner.”
Although the scope of trade measures is broad, Article X only focuses
on their publication and application, not the substantive content of rules
regarding trade conduct.16 In other words, there are two types of rules—one
providing substantive rules regulating the activities of traders, the other
providing procedural or administrative rules regulating the activities of
agencies.
To determine whether a rule is administrative, the panel in Argentina –
Hides and Leather considered that administrative rules merely provide for a
15

GATT 1994, supra note 4, art. X:1 (emphasis added).
WTO, WTO ANALYTICAL INDEX: GATT 1994 – ARTICLE X (JURISPRUDENCE) 16 [hereinafter WTO,
ANALYTICAL
INDEX
(ART.
X)],
https://www.wto.org/english/res_e/publications_e/ai17_e/
gatt1994_art10_jur.pdf (the Appellate Body in EC – Poultry explicitly stated that the substantive content of
the rules themselves falls outside the scope).
16
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means, or a certain manner, for assisting officials to apply and enforce
substantive rules.17 In line with this principle, the panel in US – CorrosionResistant Steel Sunset Review provided that the United States’ sunset review
laws, which contain different reviewing requirements from the Anti-Dumping
Agreement, refer to the substance rather than their administration.18 Thus, the
measures in question are outside the scope of Article X:3(a) of the GATT. 19
However, if substantive content regulates the administration, application, or
implementation of a legal instrument, it is within the scope and must be
uniform, impartial, and reasonable.20
In accordance with the Appellate Body in EC – Selected Customs
Matters, “uniform administration” refers to the “general application” of laws
that have a “significant impact on overall administration,” 21 but not the
“administrative process” for a series of steps or the impact on a single case.22
The uniformity of rule application, therefore, can be referring to those rules
regarding administrative “definition, guidelines or standards.”23
These written rules regarding general application in the forms of
definition, guidelines or standards, however, may be applied differently based
on unwritten concepts, impartiality, and reasonableness, in accordance with
particular circumstances. For instance, in order to pursue nondiscriminatory
and equal treatment, the panel in US – Stainless Steel (Korea) emphasized
“uniformity of treatment” of traders and provided that “uniform
17

Id. at 16. In this case, the measure in question does not create the classification requirements, provide
for export refunds, or impose export duties, therefore, is not covered by Article X:3(a) of the GATT 1994.
18
In US – Corrison-Resistant Steel Sunset Review, Japan argued that the evidentiary requirements for
self-intiation under the US’ sunset review laws were “administrative in nature.” Moreover, the U.S.
application of its sunset reviews was not uniform because it has different approach from Article 11.3 of Antidumping Agreement (AD) sunset reviews. The panel, however, ruled that the sunset reviews under Article
11.3 of AD “is not subject to the evidentiary requirements” as the United States’ sunset reviews. Thus, the
difference between AD’s and United States’ sunset reviews “is related to the substance rather than the
administration . . . .” Id. at 17.
19
Id.
20
Id.
21
Id. at 17–18 (the Appellate Body in EC – Selected Customs Matters provided that Article X:3(a) of
the GATT 1994 does not require uniform “administrative process” that “may be understood as a series of
steps, actions, or events that are taken or occur in relation to the making of an administrative decision . . . .”).
22
“Administration” emphasizes “significant impact on the overall administration . . . and not simply
on the outcome of the single case in question.” Id. at 17. The Appellate Body in EC – Selected Customs
Matters defined “application” as “putting into practical effect, or applying, a legal instrument.” Id. at 21.
23
Id. In line with this view, the panel in China – Raw Materials found that a foreign trade system that
allocates export quotas operated by thirty-two local departments without any guidelines or standards
constituted non-uniform administration. In this case, the panel considered that “there is a very real risk” that
similar exporters may be treated differently by thirty-two dispersed local offices. Id.
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administration” of laws and regulations “must be understood to mean
uniformity of treatment in respect of persons similarly situated,” and not to
require “identical results where relevant facts differ.”24
Uniform administration also aims to ensure due process, which pertains
to different subject matters and can be interpreted differently based on actual
circumstances.25 For instance, in EC – Selected Customs Matters, due process
refered to the ability of a trader to have an adverse administrative decision
reviewed.26 To the panel in this case, the due process objective suggested
“prompt review and correction” in a “quick and effective manner and without
delay.”27 The meaning of “quick” or “performed without delay,” nevertheless,
“depends on the context and particular circumstances” and “the nature of the
specific administrative action,” and “thus cannot be determined in the
abstract.”28
Consequently, the true extent of GATT’s uniformity is not well-defined
and can be of unwritten nature.29 Whether an application of trade measures or
administrative rules is “uniform, impartial and reasonable” depends on the
interpretation of the WTO’s dispute mechanism. The WTO, therefore, has the
centralized power to determine and unify the manner of rule application
regarding domestic trade measures of its Members.
In addition, the GATT expects Members’ central governments to
ensure national uniformity. Article X(3)(b) of the GATT, which concerns
publication and administration of trade measures, requires Members to
establish independent judicial, arbitral, or administrative tribunals for
reviewing and correcting administration action. 30 Thus, the central
government may ensure that trade measures are published and applied in a
unified way. Law publication, therefore, can also be a means to uniform and
centralized rule application at the national level.31

24

Id. at 20.
Id. at 3.
26
Id.
27
Id.
28
Id.
29
Id. at 16–17
30
GATT 1994, supra note 4, art. X(3)(b).
31
Padideh Ala’i & Matthew D’Orsi, Transparency in International Economic Relations and the Role
of the WTO, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON TRANSPARENCY 368, 369 (Padideh Ala’i & Robert Vaughn eds.,
2014).
25
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China’s Uniform and Centralized Obligations

The China Protocol requires uniformity and centralization beyond the
GATT. In addition to including a rule application manner and a review
mechanism, Part I, Section 2(A) emphasizes “uniform administration”
regarding (1) the entire customs territory of China, and (2) the compliance of
local rules.32 These obligations involve a governing framework covering not
only administrative rules but also substantive trade measures. Moreover, the
central government shall ensure this framework through its judiciary that is
under the executive function in practice.33
Section 2(A)(1) of the China Protocol provides, “the provisions of the
WTO Agreement and this Protocol shall apply to the entire customs territory
of China.”34 This territory includes “special economic areas” such as “border
trade regions and minority autonomous areas, Special Economic Zones, open
coastal cities, economic and technical development zones[,] and other areas
where special regimes for tariffs, taxes, and regulations are established.”35 As
such, this provision requires that the substantive rules of the WTO Agreement
to be uniformly implemented throughout the country.36
In addition, the China Protocol specifically requires local measures to
comply with the WTO Agreement. 37 These local rules include “local
regulations, rules, and other measures of local governments at the sub-national
level.”38 The international obligations under the WTO Agreement, therefore,
are transformed into national and local obligations in terms of substance. In
other words, the substantive trade measures in China can be expected to be
uniform at a higher level following WTO law.39
32

China Protocol, supra note 5, pt. I, §§ 2(A)(1)–(4).
Feng Lin, The Future of Judicial Independence in China 5 (City Univ. of H.K., May Working Paper
No.
2,
2016),
http://www6.cityu.edu.hk/cjer/lib/doc/paper/WK2_The_Future_of_Judicial
Independence_in_China.pdf. The judiciary in China is not considered to be independent, because it is within
the executive function. The Chinese review mechanism, therefore, can be a tool of the central or local
governments to enhance political and economic supervision.
34
China Protocol, supra note 5, pt. I, § 2(A)(1).
35
Id.
36
Jeffrey L. Gertler, What China’s WTO Accession Is All About, in CHINA AND THE WTO: ACCESSION,
POLICY REFORM, AND POVERTY REDUCTION STRATEGIES 27–28 (Deepak Bhattasali et al. eds., 2004).
37
China Protocol, supra note 5, pt. I, § 2(A)(3). This provision states, “China’s local regulations, rules
and other measures of local governments at the sub-national level shall conform to the obligations undertaken
in the WTO Agreement and this Protocol.”
38
Id.
39
Jerome Cohen, China’s Troubled Path to WTO, 20 INT’L FIN. L. REV. 71, 72 (2001).
33
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Besides substantive rules affecting traders, similar to the GATT, Part I,
Section 2(A)(2) of the China Protocol requires uniform rule application by
Chinese officials:40
China shall apply and administer in a uniform, impartial and
reasonable manner all its laws, regulations and other measures of
the central government as well as local regulations, rules and
other measures issued or applied at the sub-national level . . .
pertaining to or affecting trade in goods, services, trade-related
aspects of intellectual property rights (“TRIPS”) or the control of
foreign exchange.41
If this provision is interpreted in accordance with Article X of the GATT,
Chinese administrative conduct shall be “uniform, impartial and reasonable.”
This uniform obligation may be satisfied by written administrative definition,
guidelines, or standards provided by the central government.42 Moreover, the
unwritten abstract elements, impartiality, and reasonableness can be based on
the interpretation of central authorities, as well as the interpretation of WTO
law.43 As such, both substantive trade measures and their applications can be
centralized to a more significant level in Beijing and at the WTO.
Greater uniformity and centralization may also be enhanced by
transparency as a means to ensure conformity. For instance, the transparency
principle requires that China’s trade measures be shared with the WTO as an
information center for other Members at the international level, and that they
are published by an official journal with an enquiry point established by the
central government at the national level.44 These transparency requirements
serve a supporting role as secondary rules to ensure that external parties, such
as “any individual, enterprise or WTO Member,” can access substantive
measures as primary rules at the center to establish greater uniformity.45
Similar to the GATT, this greater uniformity and centralization can be
strengthened by the national review obligation. Part I, Section 2(A)(4) of the
40

China Protocol, supra note, 5, pt. I, § 2(A).
Id. pt. I, § 2(A)(2).
42
WTO, ANALYTICAL INDEX (ART. X), supra note 16, at 10–11.
43
The terms “impartial” and “reasonable” are unwritten abstract concepts because their meanings can
be changed in accordance with different facts and actual circumstances.
44
China Protocol, supra note 5, pt. I, §§ 2(B)(1), 2(C)(2)–(3).
45
Id. pt. I, § 2(C).
41
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China Protocol requires the country to “establish a mechanism under which
individuals and enterprises can bring to the attention of the national authorities
cases of non-uniform application of the trade regime.” 46 This mechanism,
moreover, relies on “tribunals . . . for the prompt review of all administrative
actions.” 47 As such, under the Protocol, China’s trade measures and their
applications are expected to be examined independently to ensure
conformity.48
These national review settings can also be considered as secondary
rules as a means to ensure the compliance with trade measures as primary
rules. Rather than being substantive rules to provide what officials or traders
shall or shall not do, these secondary rules provide a means, in the form of
independent review mechanisms, for external checks and balances to ensure
uniformity of administrative conduct and treatment. However, since China
does not have separation of powers under its democratic dictatorship, the
Chinese judiciary is still, in reality, within the executive function. 49 The
Chinese administrative and judicial review mechanisms, therefore, may not
be as independent or as impartial and reasonable as expected.50
C.

Greater Uniformity and Centralization Under the TBT
Agreement

The TBT Agreement was established in 1979. 51 Considering
international standards and systems can improve the efficiency of production,
facilitate international trade, and transfer technology, the Agreement
encourages greater uniformity.52 Such uniformity, moreover, shall be based

46

Id. at pt. I, § 2(A)(4).
Id. at pt. I, § 2(D)(1).
48
More details regarding how the Chinese review mechanism will be discussed in Part III can be found
at Nga Kit ‘Christy’ Tang, The WTO’s Impact on China: A Battle of Administrative Review Settings between
Internal and External Regulatory Frameworks, 10 VIENNA J. INT’L. CONST. L. 251, 265–70 (2016)
[hereinafter Tang, The WTO’s Impact on China].
49
Id.
50
Id. at 265.
51
TBT, supra note 10, annex A(2).
52
Id., pmbl.; Technical Information on Technical Barriers to Trade, WTO [hereinafter WTO,
Technical Information], http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/tbt_e/tbt_info_e.htm (last visited Nov. 28,
2018); RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON THE WTO AND TECHNICAL BARRIERS TO TRADE 153 (Tracy Epps &
Michael J. Trebilcock eds., 2013); THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION: LEGAL, ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL
ANALYSIS 373, 392 (Patrick F. J. Macrory et al. eds., 2005).
47
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on science that may be centralized by recognized experts and institutions.53
This regulatory process is promoted as harmonization.
The TBT Agreement focuses on three subject matters: (1) technical
standards, (2) technical regulations, and (3) conformity assessment systems. 54
Standards are defined as voluntary while regulations are mandatory. 55
Regulations and standards are “technical” when the rules “set out specific
characteristics of a product—such as its size, shape, design, functions and
performance, or the way it is labeled or packaged before it is put on sale.”56
In certain circumstances, the meaning of “technical” may extend to cover “the
way a product is produced” such as “a product’s process and production
methods” (PPMs) that affect products’ characteristics. 57 As such, technical
standards and regulations can be considered as primary substantive rules
regarding producers’ conduct in the form of what technical products should
or shall be. Moreover, these rules may govern not only producers within the
territories of regulating Members, but also the conduct of foreign exporting
producers outside their territories.58
In contrast, rather than producer action, “conformity assessment
procedures” refer to “any procedure used, directly or indirectly, to determine
that relevant requirements in technical regulations or standards are fulfilled.”59
These rules, then, focus on administrative conduct and regulatory settings of
53

TBT, supra note 10, pmbl.; Technical Information on Technical Barriers to Trade, WTO
[hereinafter WTO, Technical Information], http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/tbt_e/tbt_info_e.htm (last
visited Nov. 28, 2018); RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON THE WTO AND TECHNICAL BARRIERS TO TRADE 153
(Tracy Epps & Michael J. Trebilcock eds., 2013); THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION: LEGAL ECONOMIC
AND POLITICAL ANALYSIS 373 & 392 (Patrick F. J. Macrory et al. eds., 2005).
54
TBT, supra note 10, art. 1.6.
55
Id., annex 1, ¶¶ 1–2; WTO, Technical Information, supra note 53.
56
TBT, supra note 10, annex 1, ¶¶ 1–2; WTO, Technical Information, supra note 53.
57
TBT, supra note 10, annex 1, ¶¶ 1–2; WTO, Technical Information, supra note 53; CHRISTINE R.
CONRAD, PROCESSES AND PRODUCTION METHODS (PPMS) IN WTO LAW: INTERFACTING TRADE AND SOCIAL
GOALS 381 (2011).
58
When certain PPMs (product’s process and production methods) are required under an importing
countries’ regulations, these rules require how and what foreign producers shall do during the production
process in exporting countries. An example is the WTO Shrimp – Turtle case, Section 609 of U.S. Public
Law 101–102 requires shrimp to be harvested using certain technology to protect sea turtles. This rule
governs the conduct of shrimp harvesters in India, Malaysia, Pakistan, and Thailand who export their shrimp
products to the United States. In other words, although the shrimp harvest activities are not conducted within
U.S. territory, those activities can be governed by U.S. law, as long as their products are exported to the
United
States.
India
etc
versus
US:
‘shrimp-turtle’,
WTO,
https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/envir_e/edis08_e.htm (last visited Nov. 28, 2018) (summarizing the
case).
59
TBT, supra note 10, annex 1, 3.
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governments, non-governmental bodies, and assessment organizations. 60
Moreover, these administrative and procedural rules can be viewed as
secondary rules as a means to ensure the conformity of primary rules
regarding implementation.61
Under the Preamble of the TBT Agreement, Members have a right to
take measures necessary at the level they consider appropriate to ensure export
quality; to protect life, health, and the environment; and to prevent deception,
as long as such measures do not create unnecessary obstacles in international
trade and are not applied in a manner which would constitute a means of
arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination.62
Article 2.4 of the TBT Agreement, however, also states, “[w]here
technical regulations are required and relevant international standards exist or
their completion is imminent, Members shall use them . . . as a basis for their
[domestic] technical regulations.” 63 In EC – Sardines, the Appellate Body
considered the meaning of “as a basis for” which may require “a very strong
and very close relationship” between national regulations and international
standards.64 As such, voluntary international standards are considered to have
“automatic legal force” in the WTO that can be automatically and uniformly
transformed to be mandatory domestic regulations, unless exceptions apply.65
In accordance with Article 2.4 of the TBT Agreement, exceptions
present “when such international standards or relevant parts would be an
ineffective or inappropriate means for the fulfilment of the legitimate
objectives pursued” regarding climatic, geographic, and technical issues of
regulating Members.66 In the view of the Appellate Body in EC – Sardines,

60

Id. arts. 5, 6, 7.
Id. art. 5.1
62
Id. pmbl.
63
Id. art. 2.4 [emphasis added].
64
Robert Howse, Regulatory Cooperation, Regional Trade Agreements, and World Trade Law:
Conflict or Complementarity?, 78 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBs. 137, 144–45 (2015) [hereinafter Howse,
Regulatory Cooperation].
61

65

Robert Howse & Philip I. Levy, The TBT Panels: US
TRADE REV. 327, 349–51 (2013).
66
TBT, supra note 10, art. 2.4 (emphasis added).

– Cloves, US – Tuna, US – Cool, 12 WORLD

January 2019

Greater Uniformity and Centralization

77

Members must define regulating objectives.67 However, the burden of proof
regarding when the relevant international standards would be an effective and
appropriate means is allocated to complainants—the regulated, mainly
exporting Members whose “trade interests are significantly affected.” 68
Although some scholars have pointed out difficulties in practice, these
international standards have succeeded in creating greater uniformity among
Members’ technical regulations.69
Besides, international standards can be centralized in a few “relevant
international standardizing bodies.” 70 Under the TBT Agreement,
“international body and system” refers to those institutions “whose
membership is open to the relevant bodies of at least all Members.”71 This can
mainly be associated with the International Organization for Standardization
(ISO) and International Electrotechnical Commission (IEC),72 as well as the
United Nations system that provides general terms for substantive
standardization and procedures for assessment of conformity.73
Theoretically, the legitimacy of these international bodies is based on
the openness of transparency, participation, and impartiality of all interested
Members at all stages of standards development. 74 In practice, the
international standards development process within international bodies are
often considered to be biased and closed. 75 The performance of experts in
technical committees is also questionable considering the conflict of interest
among their expertises, national identities, and relations with private sectors.76
67

See Appellate Body Report, European Communities—Trade Description of Sardines, ¶¶ 276–79,
WTO Doc. WT/DS231/AB/R (adopted July 29, 2003); Petros C. Mavroids, Driftin’ Too Far from Shore—
Why the Test for Compliance with the TBT Agreement Developed by The WTO Appellate Body Is Wrong,
and What Should the AB Have Done Instead, 12 WORLD TRADE REV. 509, 514 (2013); Appellate Body
Report, European Communities—Trade Description of Sardines, ¶¶ 276–79, WT/DS231/AB/R (Sept. 26,
2002).
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TBT, supra note 10, art. 14.4; see also Mavroids, supra note 67, at 523; Joanne Scott, International
Trade and Environmental Governance: Relating Rules (and Standards) in the EU and the WTO, 15 EUR. J.
INT’L. L. 307, 326–27 (2004); TBT, supra note 10, art. 14.4.
69
See Mavroids, supra note 67, at 523; Scott, supra note 68, at 328.
70
TBT, supra note 10, annex 1, ¶ 2.3(G).
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Id. annex 1, ¶ 4.
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Id. arts. 1–2.
73
Id. art. 1.1.
74
See Erik Wijkstorm & Devin McDaniels, Improving Regulatory Governance: International
Standards and the WTO TBT Agreement, 47 J. WORLD TRADE 1013, 1029, 1035, 1038, 1040 (Oct. 2013);
HUMBERTO Z. SCHRODER, HARMONIZATION, EQUIVALENCE AND MUTUAL RECOGNITION OF STANDARDS IN
WTO LAW 81–82 (2011).
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See Wijkstorm & McDaniels, supra note 74, at 1038, 1040.
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See SCHRODER, supra note 74, at 78.
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Despite these challenges, the development of international technical standards
has been centralized at those organizations to enhance uniformity.77
This international centralization, moreover, requires greater domestic
centralization and uniformity as well. Article 7.5 of the TBT Agreement, in
particular, obliges Members’ central governments to take full responsibility
for formulating and implementing “positive measures and mechanisms” in
supporting other regulatory bodies within their territories. 78 Those positive
measures are described as “reasonable measures” to “ensure compliance” of
local governments and non-governmental bodies, 79 such as notifying local
governments of the TBT requirements, and not “tak[ing] measures which
require or encourage local government bodies and non-government bodies . . .
to act in a manner inconsistent” with the TBT provisions.80 As such, national
centralization frameworks are established to ensure that voluntary
international standards are implemented at the local level in the form of
mandatory measures.81
Centralization also comes with preemption.82 Article 4.1 of the TBT
Agreement requires Members’ central government standardizing bodies to
“accept and comply with the Code of Good Practice for the Preparation,
Adoption and Application of Standards (Code of Good Practice, CGP) in
Annex 3[,]” which states that standardizing bodies “shall make every effort to
avoid duplication of, or overlap with, the work of other standardizing bodies
in the national territory or with the work of relevant international or regional
standardizing bodies.”83 In other words, if certain technical standards have
been set by TBT’s recognized international or regional bodies, national
standardizing bodies may not establish another set of standards on the same
subject matter. International standards, therefore, may restrain Members from

77

See Jonathan Carlone, An Added Exception to the TBT Agreement After Clove, Yuna II, and Cool,
37 B.C. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 103, 107 (2014); Howse, Regulatory Cooperation, supra note 64, at 144–
45; Pluralism in Practice, supra note 11, at 135.
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TBT, supra note 10, art. 7.5.
79
Id. arts. 3.5, 4.1, 5.1 5.4.; see also Pluralism in Practice, supra note 11, at 135.
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TBT, supra note 10, art. 3.2, 3.4.
81
See Scott, supra note 68, at 310 (suggesting governance to be premised upon coordination not
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note 11, at 135; James Bacchus, A Common Gauge: Harmonization and International Law, 37 B. C. INT’L
7 COMP. L. REV. 1, 9 (2014).
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See Henrik Horn et al., In the Shadow of the DSU: Addressing Specific Trade Concerns in the WTO
SPS and TBT Committees, 47 J. WORLD TRADE 729, 730 (2013).
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regulating technical products.84 The regulatory power that brings economic
power is further centralized at the international standardization bodies and
central governments.
In addition to the direct path above, the TBT Agreement provides
indirect paths, such as “equivalent regulations” and “mutual recognition,” to
harmonize technical measures among members towards greater uniformity.
For instance, Article 2.7 of the TBT Agreement requires Members to “give
positive consideration” to equivalent technical regulations of other Members,
provided that “they are satisfied that these regulations adequately fulfill the
objectives of their own regulations.”85
Considering the “objectives” provided, Article 2.7 of the TBT
Agreement refers to “legitimate objectives” regarding the right of Members
to adopt “appropriate levels of protection.” 86 These “legitimate objectives”
and “appropriate levels of protection,” as stated in Article 2.2 of the TBT
Agreement, nevertheless, “shall not be more trade-restrictive than necessary”
and have to take account of “the risks non-fulfillment would create.” 87 In
assessing such risks, relevant elements include “available scientific and
technical information, related processing technology or intended end-uses of
products.”88
The TBT Agreement does not provide further detail regarding what is
“necessary.” The WTO panel in EC – Asbestos, however, observed that
provisions of the TBT Agreement are very similar to those in Article XX of
the GATT.89 Accordingly, in proving a measure is “necessary,” Members may
“rely, in good faith, on scientific sources which, at that time, may represent a
divergent, but qualified and respected, opinion.”90 Moreover, with respect to
health policy, Members do not have to follow “a majority scientific
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gatt1994_art20_jur.pdf; see also Mavroids, supra note 67, at 515–16; GATT 1994, supra note 4, arts. XX–
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opinion.” 91 Whether a TBT Agreement measure is appropriate, therefore,
depends on qualitative, instead of quantitative scientific information.
What does “qualitative scientific information” mean? The TBT
Agreement states that a panel “may establish a technical expert group to assist
in questions of a technical nature, requiring detailed consideration by
experts.”92 Moreover, these experts are restricted to “persons of professional
standing and experience in the field in question.”93 Thus, although equivalent
requirements seem to accept different technical regulations, the scope of these
measures are subject to the views of recognized experts who are often
affiliated with international standardizing bodies that are mainly located in
developed countries.94
With respect to less developed countries, the TBT Agreement requires
Members to provide “differential and more favorable treatment” to
developing country Members (DCMs) and to ensure that their technical
regulations, standards, and conformity assessment procedures “do not create
unnecessary obstacles to exports” from those Members. 95 The TBT
Agreement also recognizes that DCMs “should not be expected to use
international standards as a basis for their [domestic] technical regulations or
standards.”96
Under these recognitions, DCMs may adopt technical standards with
lower protection, which may open greater market access for developed
countries. In addition, although the WTO mechanism does not penalize lower
protection standards that do not constitute barriers to trade, DCMs’ lower
domestic standards harm their export capabilities in practice. For instance,
lower standard products made in DCMs may not be able to meet higher
technical requirements in developed countries, thereby preventing their export.
In order to lessen the harm caused by this lower standard export limitation,
corporations located in DCMs may still have to adopt international technical
standards issued by international standardizing bodies. On the other hand,
developed countries may not adopt higher technical standards with greater
protection comparing with international technical standards, which may
91
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TBT, supra note 10, art. 14.
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Id. annex 2, art. 2.
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Nicholas A. Ashford, Letter to the Editor: “Trade Policy”, ISSUES SCI. TECH., Winter 2014, at 14–
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constitute barriers to trade. As such, the scope of technical measures of both
developed and developing countries would lead to greater uniformity by the
central role of international standards and bodies.
Similar to “equivalent regulations,” the TBT Agreement offers “mutual
recognition” to allow Members to accept different conformity assessment
procedures from their own, “provided that they are satisfied those procedures
offer an assurance of conformity with applicable technical regulations or
standards equivalent to their own procedures.” 97 This mutually satisfactory
understanding, however, shall be based on prior consultations regarding the
“technical competence” of assessment bodies in exporting Members, which
require verified compliance with “relevant guides or recommendations issued
by international standardizing bodies.”98 In other words, although the TBT
Agreement accepts different assessment procedures, these procedures are still
governed by the guidance of international standardization bodies. Thus,
alternate assessment procedures are also directed by the same group of experts
at the same organizations.
D.

Greater Uniformity and Centralization Under the SPS
Agreement

Concerning international food safety and animal and plant health, the
WTO passed the SPS Agreement on January 1, 1995. 99 This Agreement
provides administrative rules for Members’ domestic sanitary and
phytosanitary (SPS) measures, which cover “all relevant laws, decrees,
regulations, requirements and procedures” including “end product criteria;
processes and production methods; testing, inspection, certification and
approval procedures; quarantine treatments . . . and packaging and labelling
requirements directly related to food safety.”100
Similar to the TBT Agreement, the SPS Agreement emphasizes that
Members have the right to set their own standards.101 Members should not be
prevented from “adopting or enforcing measures necessary to protect human,
97

Id. art. 6.1.
Id.
99
WTO, WTO AGREEMENTS SERIES: SANITARY AND PHYTOSANITARY MEASURES 27–44 (1995)
[hereinafter SPS MEASURES], https://www.wto.org/english/res_e/booksp_e/agrmntseries4_sps_e.pdf
(containing introductory explanations and the body of the legal text).
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Id. 37.
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Id. pmbl. at 9, art. 2.1.
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animal or plant life or health.” 102 However, domestic SPS measures,
especially those that introduce a higher level of protection, are subject to
certain “harmonized” and centralized conditions.103
In the words of the SPS Agreement, domestic SPS measures shall be
“based on the relevant international standards, guidelines[,] or
recommendations,” 104 “scientific principles with sufficient scientific
evidence,” 105 and “applied only to the extent necessary to protect human,
animal or plant life or health.” 106 In particular, those SPS measures
conforming to international standards, guidelines and recommendations
(ISGRs) “shall be deemed to be necessary.”107
In addition, those relevant ISGRs shall be recognized by “relevant
international organizations” (RIOs), which explicitly refer to the Codex
Alimentarius Commission relating to food safety;108 the International Office
of Epizootics relating to animal health and zoonoses;109 and the Secretariat
and regional organizations operating within the framework of International
Plant Protection Convention regarding plant health. 110 If matters are not
covered by these RIOs, appropriate standards, guidelines and
recommendations may be promulgated by other RIOs identified by the WTO
Committee on the SPS (the SPS Committee).111
Other than the international and appropriate standards provided,
recognized, or identified by relevant RIOs or the SPS Committee, the SPS
Agreement accepts “equivalent” standards. 112 To the SPS Committee,
“equivalence” does not require “duplication and sameness” of measures, but
focuses on an importing Member’s “appropriate level of protection.”113 As a
basic principle, Members’ adopted levels are presumed to be appropriate.114
102
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However, whether a protection level is considered consistent with the WTO
law is mainly subject to risk assessment.115
Under the SPS Agreement, “risk assessment” is defined as an
evaluation of the likelihood of potential harm or damage, such as the spread
of diseases, biological and economic consequences, or the adverse effects on
animal and human health, that is associated with SPS measures in importing
countries.116 This evaluation, in particular, must take into account available
and relevant scientific and environmental evidence, as well as economic
factors. 117 Moreover, the “likelihood” and “potential” or “probability” of
harm is primarily based on qualitative methodologies.118
This risk assessment that determines the appropriateness of Member
adopted levels of protection also depends on RIOs.119 Article 5.1 SPS requires
that domestic SPS measures to be based on appropriate assessments of the
risks to human, animal, or plant life or health by “taking into account risk
assessment techniques developed by the relevant international
organizations.”120 In other words, Members’ appropriate levels of protection
shall be based on appropriate risk assessment, which shall be based on the
techniques developed by the same international organizations.
Other than sufficient scientific evidence based on RIOs, domestic SPS
measures may be provisionally adopted “on the basis of available pertinent
information” from the RIOs and SPS measures adopted by other Members,
but it is subject to “the additional information necessary for a more objective
assessment of risk and review” within a reasonable period. 121 Similar to
appropriate levels of protection, although Members may adopt the same SPS
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measures as other Members, these measures are still subject to “objective risk
assessment” that is based on the techniques developed by RIOs.
Moreover, if a Member has “reason to believe” that a domestic SPS
measure “is constraining, or has the potential to constrain, its exports,” the
regulated Member may request an explanation of the reasons that shall be
provided by the regulating Member.122 Likewise, whether an explanation is
reasonable is very likely to be determined by the WTO, which relies on
scientific and technical experts who can be related to the same recognized
international organizations.123
As Article 11.2 of the SPS suggests, WTO panels should seek advice
from experts chosen by the panel and the parties.124 In addition, the panel may
“establish an advisory technical experts group” or consult the RIOs. 125 As
such, the RIOs and related experts may set “international standards, guidelines,
recommendations” that are deemed necessary, determine whether domestic
SPS measures are “based on” such standards, whether the protection levels of
such measures are equivalent or appropriate, and whether explanations
regarding SPS measures are reasonable. 126 Under this scientific approach,
international SPS measures can be, or are encouraged to be, uniform and
centralized by several recognized international organizations and experts.127
This uniformity and centralization also extends to the domestic level.
Similar to the TBT Agreement, Members are required to support the SPS
Agreement by formulating and implementing “positive measures and
mechanisms.” 128 Central governments must take reasonable measures to
ensure the compliance of regional bodies and non-governmental entities.129
Hence, domestic SPS measures shall be harmonized, towards greater
uniformity, with a more centralized framework.

122
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This harmonization also covers the least developed or developing
country Members (DCMs). The SPS Agreement requires Members to provide
technical assistance, and the SPS Committte may grant DCMs “longer timeframes for compliance” and “time-limited exceptions.” DCMs, however, shall
still adopt the SPS measures issued by RIOs. 130 Considering the SPS
Committee functions to keep “close contact” with RIOs and to further
international harmonization,131 those provisions of technical assistance and
time exceptions for DCMs can also be a centralized means of creating greater
uniformity.
To briefly summarize, domestic measures shall be uniform and
governed by the WTO and central authorities. The GATT begins with the
“uniform, impartial and reasonable manner” for rule application, focusing on
administrative conduct and procedures. Then, the China Protocol covers
“uniform administration,” which extends to substantive trade measures. When
food and product safety is concerned, the TBT and SPS Agreements further
transform substantive international voluntary standards into domestic
mandatory regulations. In light of the WTO law, Chinese food and product
safety rules, therefore, can be expected to be uniform under a centralized
framework.
CHINA’S DECENTRALIZED FLEXIBILITY

III.

In contrast to the WTO’s uniformity and centralization, the Chinese
food and product safety system relies on decentralization and flexibility,
which may not be as transparent and unified as the WTO expects. Although
China adopts the one-party “democratic dictatorship” that requires politically
unifying views and thoughts, 132 the Chinese regulatory system has
decentralized standards and administrative structures. This system can be
viewed as self-regulatory, but also laissez-faire, which has led to rapid
economic growth, but also severe abuses. Take, for instance, a 2007 incident
where nearly a million toys that China exported to the United States were
recalled when the United States discovered lead paint had been used, or the
130
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melamine dairy crisis, which killed six infants and caused 300,000 people in
China to fall ill.133
A.

Decentralized Standards

Chinese food and product standards are governed by the
Standardization Law, which was enacted in 1988 and came into effect in
1989. 134 Under this statute, technical standards pertain to quality, testing
methods, technical terms, and the process of producing industrial and
agricultural products, environment protection, and construction projects.135
In light of the Standardization Law, the state is required to “encourage
the active adoption of international standards” 136 and to unify technical
requirements.137 This unified administration, however, is governed by various
departments at different levels: (1) Standardization Administration (SA) and
“competent administrative authorities” (CAAs) under the State Council at the
national level; 138 (2) the SAs of provinces, autonomous regions and
municipalities (PAMs) directly under the central government, and CAAs
under those departments of PAMs; and (3) the SAs and the CAAs at the city
and county levels.139 Since the statute does not define the term CAAs, the
governing power is, therefore, fragmented by both identified and unidentified
administrations, departments, and authorities at different levels in terms of
vertical administrative structure and horizontal geographical regions.
In addition, these identified and unidentified administrations,
authorities, and sectors may formulate their own standards. Under the
Standardization Law, there are four types of standards: (1) National standards,
which shall be unified nationwide and formulated by the SA under the State
Council; (2) Trade standards, which are formulated by CAAs, in the absence
133
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of national standards; (3) Local standards, which are formulated by SAs of
PAMs and shall be “unified within a PAM directly under the Central
government,” in the absence of national and trade standards; and (4) Industrial
standards, which shall be formulated by enterprises for the products they
manufacture, in the absence of both national and trade standards.140 As such,
different standards can be formulated by officials at different departments and
levels, as well as corporations of different sectors.
Following the Standardization Law, the Product Quality Law (PQL)
was enacted in 1993 and amended in 2000.141 The PQL requires the state to
encourage “enterprises to make their product quality reach and surpass their
respective [sectorial] standards, national standards and international
standards.”142 Moreover, industries may establish their own standards through
government approval based on a voluntary principle. 143 In other words,
enterprises do not have legal obligations to adopt international standards.144
Hence, although international standards are encouraged at the central
level, agencies, local administrations, and enterprises may formulate their
own standards, especially when the upper levels are silent.145 This structure
simultaneously encourages national unification and centralization, but also
allows varied standards in different regions and sectors. Centralizing and
unifying standards refers to the national standards that must be applied in the
entire country. Varied standards, however, may fill in the gap and can be
encouraged to reach or surpass the standards at upper levels. The food and

140
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product standards applied in China, therefore, may not be as unified and
centralized as WTO law expects.146
B.

Decentralized Administrations

Unlike the uniform and centralized administration envisioned by WTO
law, Chinese food and product safety is administered by a large number of
disparate governmental institutions. For instance, under the Food Safety Law
(FSL), which was enacted in 2009 and amended in 2015, national food
standards shall be administered by different agencies, such as: (1) the health
administrative department; (2) standardization authorities; (3) health and
agricultural authorities; and (4) “competent authorities” under the State
Council. 147 At the local level, the food safety shall be administered by
“departments for health, agriculture, quality supervision, industry and
commerce[,] and the FDAs [Food and Drug Administrations] at the county
level or above.” 148 Since China has more than 2,800 governments at the
county-level and each county has their own agencies, the Chinese food safety
administration is fragmented and decentralized to more than 10 thousand
central and local departments at the different levels and regions.149
Under the Chinese vertical administrative hierarchy, local
administrations are governed, directly or indirectly, by upper level
administrations. 150 However, in accordance with the Law on Legislation,
enacted in 2000 and amended in 2015, local governments have open
rulemaking power to formulate their own rules and regulations that can differ
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from the law at the central level. 151 These local measures, moreover, are
mainly interpreted by local lawmakers,152 as Chinese judges do not interpret
law—as common law judges would—but instead apply law as interpreted by
lawmakers.153 As such, even if local trade measures are published in a timely
manner under the WTO’s transparency principle, it might not necessarily
mean that those measures would be implemented or applied in the same way
or in a “uniform, impartial and reasonable manner.”
Under the WTO Agreements, the central government is obliged to
ensure the compliance of local institutions. This obligation raises another
consistent challenge regarding the information gap between the central and
local governments in China. In light of the hierarchical administrative system,
local administrations are responsible for reporting and seeking instruction
from the central government.154 In practice, in order to secure their positions,
local officials may not be willing to expose the shortcomings and mistakes
they encounter. 155 The central authority, moreover, often does not have
sufficient resources with an effective management system for gathering
updated information regarding actual local circumstances.156
One way for the central administration to receive local information is
through petitions. 157 The Chinese petition system creates a direct
communication channel between national citizens and the central
Id. ch. 2 (this rulemaking power is subject to certain principles, such as based on “actual needs,”
“specific administration,” and “local affairs”); Laney Zhang, China: Law on Legislation Amended, LIBRARY
OF CONGRESS, (July 8, 2015), http://www.loc.gov/law/foreign-news/article/china-law-on-legislationamended/.
152
Tang, China v. China, supra note 2, at 126.
153
Fa guan fa (法官法) [Judges Law] (promulgated by Order No. 38 of the President of the People’s
Republic of China on Feb. 28, 1995, effective Feb. 28, 1995, amended on June 30, 2001), CLI.1.35754(EN)
(Lawinfochina) (under the Chinese legal system, judges shall “perform their functions and duties according
to law,” but not make law).
154
Lifa fa (立法法) [Law on Legislation] (adopted by the third Session of the Ninth Nat’l People’s
Cong., Mar. 15, 2000, effective July 1, 2000), art. 87, CLI.1.26942(EN) (Lawinfochina); Tang, China v.
China, supra note 2, at 127.
155
Poor food safety performance of provincial officials can lead to disqualification of awards and
honorary titles which affect their promotions and evaluations in the administrative system. See China to
Grade Provincial Governments’ Food Safety Performance, CHINA DAILY (Aug. 30, 2016),
http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/business/2016-08/30/content_26640404.htm.
156
Guanyuan taishang jiang lixiang taixia fubai (官員台上講理想台下腐敗) [Officials Speak of
Idealism on Stage Corrupt in Action], H.K. ECON J. (Mar. 9, 2013), http://www.hkej.com/template/
dailynews/jsp/detail.jsp?dnews_id=3651&title_id=582923.
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(Sep.
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2014),
http://english.gov.cn/state_council/2014/10/01/
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government.158 However, due to the numerous cases and limited resources,
this system requires filing at the local level before filing with Beijing.159 As
such, even if a central petition system exists, the central government often
relies on local administrations to investigate and provide resolutions. This
centralized petition system, therefore, is also based on a decentralized setting,
which often leads to local retaliation against petitioners.160
In 2013, the State Bureau for Letters and Visits (SBLV) at Beijing
created a national network to accept online petitions directly from local
citizens. The aim is to establish a centralized and “unified data interface
standard” to collect complaints and share information with provincial
officials.161 This centralized and unified setting, however, can be corrupted.
Recently, two leading officials and their subordinates at the SBLV were found
to have been bribed by local officials to remove complaint files that showed
their wrongdoings. 162 Under the current performance evaluation system,
officials are required to have low numbers of petitions.163 In order to secure
their positions and avoid punishment, provincial officials who should assist
petitioners often detain peititioners in “black jails,” force petitioners to leave
Beijing, and “openly use funds to bribe” the central officials at SBLV.164 The
effectiveness of this communication channel is, therefore, dubious.
Another alternative way for receiving local information is through the
media. However, the CPC Constitution requires unifying views of members,

158

Id.
Guowuyuan xinfang tiaoli ( 国 务 院 信 访 条 例 ) [Regulation on Complaint Letters and Visits]
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http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2014-04/11/content_17428952.htm.
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Guo jia xin fang ju wo an: shou bai ming di fang xin fang gan bu hui kuan yin man shang fang bu
bao (国家信访局窝案：收百名地方信访干部贿款 隐瞒上访不报) [Cases Harbouring at the State Bureau
of Letters and Calls: Receiving Bribes from A Hundred of Local Officials, Hiding Petitions Without Reports],
GUANCHA, (Apr. 10, 2017), http://www.guancha.cn/FaZhi/2017_04_10_402798.shtml.
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11, 2017,), https://www.scmp.com/news/china/policies-politics/article/2086741/corruption-top-rung-chinasancient-petition-system; An Bajie, New Regulation to Improve How Govt Handles Petitions, CHINA DAILY
(Apr. 25, 2017), http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/201404/25/content_17463507.htm.
164
Id.
159

January 2019

Greater Uniformity and Centralization

91

and the Party considers censorship a core policy.165 President Xi Jinping, in
particular, requires all news media “to strictly follow the Party’s leadership
and focus on ‘positive reporting.’”166 In 2017, a centralized online verification
team was also set up to analyze “online rumors.” 167 Informal food safety
reports can be viewed to be “harmful information” that induce severe
punishment.168 Shortcomings and non-compliance of administrations can be
“sensitive matters” that should not be discussed.169 The transparency at the
local level, therefore, can be distant from what WTO law requires.
C.

Flexible Standards Under Private Law

Besides decentralized standards and administrative settings, Chinese
export product safety is primarily based on the agreed-upon standards
between foreign buyers and local sellers, notwithstanding the existence of
international, national, trade, local, or industrial standards. This contractual
safety standard requirement is established in the Standardization Law. 170
Article 16 provides, “Technical requirements for export products shall comply
with agreements contained in the contracts.” 171 As such, export product
standards are based on contracts related to private law, which can be
differentiated from domestic or international standards relying on
administrative supervision related to public law.172
The Chinese contract-based private law approach is also a flexible
approach. Contractual parties bear the principal responsibility for food and
product safety. Standards adopted may vary depending on buyers in different
165

Xinhua, Full Text Of Resolution On Amendment To CPC Constitution, CHINA DAILY (Oct. 24, 2017),
http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/19thcpcnationalcongress/2017-10/24/content_33656521_3.htm;
China’s Xi Underscores CPC’s Leadership in News Reporting, XINHUA (Feb. 19, 2016),
http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2016-02/19/c_135114305.htm; Yu Hua, Censorship’s Many Faces, N.Y.
TIMES (Feb. 27, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/02/28/opinion/yu-censorships-manyfaces.html.
166
Xi’s Speech Sparked Reflection, CHINA DAILY (Feb. 21, 2017), http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/
china/2017-02/21/content_28279094.htm.
167
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http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2017-04/20/content_29005038.htm.
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chinadaily.com.cn/china/2017-05/07/content_29238613.htm.
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See He Weifang, Rule of Law in China: Prospects and Challenges, BROOKINGS (Nov. 28, 2012),
http://www.brookings.edu/events/2012/11/28-china-law (Some scholars argue that China applies a
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countries and circumstances. For instance, buyers for the American market
are assumed to require products that satisfy the U.S. safety standard; buyers
for the European market are assumed to require products that satisfy the E.U.
safety standards; and the same for foreign buyers from Japan, Africa, Latin
America, and others.173 Chinese export product standards, therefore, can be
open and negotiable.
Another reason for the adoption of contractual standards under private
law is prices. Varied standards involve varied costs. Materials, workmanship,
and production processes have different grades based on value, and each
market and buyer has different budgets and requirements. These budgets and
requirements control the safety standards applied. Particularly when most
manufacturers in China are original equipment manufacturers that do not have
their own brands and designs, the quality applied relies on buyers’ budgets
and instructions.174
This flexible approach is also linked with the market policy.175 Since
the open-door policy was adopted in 1979, Deng Xiaoping emphasized a
market-oriented economic system that is shifting from planning to open
economic settings.176 Contractual parties, such as manufacturers in China and
foreign importers, can be comparatively free to negotiate and determine prices
and the safety standards involved. This freedom comes from the belief that
the market is able to adjust safety standards in a way that benefits not only
both parties, but society as a whole. Substandard products can be screened out

173

This approach assumes that satisfying the safety standards for each export markets is in the best
interest of foreign buyers and Chinese manufacturers.
174
This reliance also explains why Chinese manufacturers often ask for buyers’ samples and budgets
before negotiation and confirmation of orders. These samples provided indicate the level of quality standard
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PRODUCTION GAME 16–25 (2009).
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from the market through competition; only good quality products accepted by
the market survive.
This open and flexible approach is, moreover, based on the reality and
feasibility that Chinese officials may not have better product and safety
knowledge than private industries or foreign investors. In non-private sectors,
such as state-owned enterprises, Chinese administrative agencies may not
intervene because these businesses are governed and controlled by
government officials already. This Chinese private law approach with little
administrative supervision, therefore, is a laissez-faire one177 contrasting with
the WTO’s public law approach, which expects administrative supervision
directing more significant uniformity with centralized settings.
D.

Reliance on Ex Post Remedies

The differences between China’s private law and WTO’s public law
approaches have led to different administrative roles when it comes to the
timing of the application of laws and extent of control. WTO law tends to
focus on an ex ante preventive approach relying on administrative supervision
before incidents occur. China, however, tends to adopt an ex post
responsibility approach to self-regulation relying on administrative and legal
responsibilities after product safety incidents.
The Chinese ex post responsibility approach emphasizes remedies.
These remedies can be administrative, criminal, civil, and others. For instance,
in the Mattel case concerning toxic lead paint toys in 2007, the Ministry of
Commerce (MOFCOM) promised to “investigate and take tough measures,”
and the General Administration of Quality Supervision, Inspection and
Quarantine (GAQSIQ) banned exports from suspect toymakers after the
incident.178
Although recall systems and new regulations were introduced, these
new requirements still focus on the responsibilities and remedies after the fact,
such as requiring manufacturers to terminate production and sales, notify
vendors and customers, and report to authorities when safety incidents

177

Tang, China v. China, supra note 2, ch. 5 (Political Dictatorship Versus Laissez-Faire
Administration: Law As Written Action).
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Bernice Chan, Investigation Aims to Ensure Toy Safety, CHINA DAILY (Aug. 17, 2007),
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occur. 179 Producers are subject to fines and are responsible for taking all
necessary measures, for instance, to replace, refund, and mitigate damages.180
A similar approach is also emphasized in the new amendment of the FSL
adopted in 2015 by increasing civil, criminal, and administrative penalties.181
This “ex post remedies” approach also links with the self-regulatory
approach related to the Chinese tradition. 182 Instead of relying on
administrative supervision, manufacturers themselves are responsible for
taking preventive actions. For instance, in the Mattel case, although there were
Chinese national standard limits for lead levels in toys, Chinese regulators
very likely did not conduct the inspection and instead relied on self-regulation
of manufacturers. 183 Thus, in practice, factories may use the paint they
want.184 Only after millions of foreign recalls, did the MOFCOM promise that
“toy producers’ self-regulatory mechanisms will . . . be improved to ensure
quality.” 185 The GAQSIQ also stated that the agency will “train the
manufacturers to raise their self-discipline.”186
This self-regulatory approach is also laid down by food and product
safety laws. For instance, the FSL explicitly requires food producers and
distributors to “ensure food safety, be credible and self-disciplined”187 and
“establish a self-inspection system . . . on a regular basis,”188 as well as food
industry associations to “strengthen industry self-discipline”189 and consumers’
“awareness of . . . self-protection.”190
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Under this self-regulatory approach, producers are, therefore, primarily
responsible for preventing and eliminating unsafe food and toys.191 Quality
inspections by provincial agencies should be conducted only when it is
necessary.192 In the words of Chinese official media, “when necessary, the
quality watchdog [GAQSIQ] at and above the provincial levels should
supervise,” and “the government took all measures after the safety of Chinamade products became a major concern.”193
This self-regulatory approach, moreover, is generally adopted by the
Chinese administration. For instance, in 2016 the MOFCOM announced plans
to optimize “the self-discipline mechanism” in the catering industry.194 Also,
in the Work Report of the Government (2016), Premier of the State Council
Li Keqiang required officials “to be strict with oneself in practicing selfcultivation, using power, and exercising self-discipline.”195 Thus, in contrast
with the WTO’s preventive approach that relies on external administrative
supervision, China’s preventive approach is at the opposite end of the
spectrum, relying on internal self-regulation reinforced with ex post
sanctions.196
In summary, considering the decentralized flexibility embraced by the
Chinese food and product safety’s regulatory system, this section discussed
the standardization and administrative measures that can be formulated,
administered, and interpreted by more than ten thousand identified and
unidentified authorities at the central and local levels. Moreover, due to the
ineffective management system and the control of media, the central
government may not be notified of the actual circumstances.
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The standards adopted for export products can be varied and based on
contracts agreed to by foreign buyers and Chinese enterprises. Instead of the
WTO’s preventive approach that emphasizes administrative supervision to
prevent harm, China’s approach embraces private law and highlights selfregulation and ex post remedies. Thus, the Chinese regulatory system, while
rightly assumed to be highly centralized and anthoritarian, is, in many aspects,
a laissez-faire one based on decentralization and flexibility in practice. While
this flexibility may have caused rapid economic growth, it has also enabled
food and product safety crises.
CHINA’S UNIFORMITY AND CENTRALIZATION DEVELOPMENT

IV.

After joining the WTO and becoming subject to its laws, and with
consideration for the importance of the food and product safety issue, the
Chinese administration has begun instituting the international approach by
requiring greater administrative supervision regarding centralization and
uniformity. This centralized and uniform development is visible in statutes
and regulations, as well as the governing structure.
This section examines this development trend towards (1) higher
centralization concerning the roles of experts, agencies, and the State Council;
(2) uniform and unified information regarding food safety issues; (3)
uniformity by imposing collective responsibility on third parties, as “related
entities,” to require a higher level of peer surveillance; and (4) more uniform
standards adopted voluntarily to increase competitiveness.
A.

Greater Centralization of Administrative Control

Although the FSL laid down a decentralized administrative structure, it
required a system with greater centralization than existed at the time. 197
Following the WTO law, this centralized development underscores
administrative control with the international terms such as “risk,” “prevention,”
and “scientific supervision,” among others. For instance, Article 3 of the FSL
requires that “food safety shall first be subject to prevention, risk management,

FSL, supra note 147, art. 56 (requiring that “local governments at and above county level shall take
overall responsibility for lead, organize and coordinate the supervision and management of food safety in
their jurisdiction,” and “define the responsibilities of the administrative departments for health, agriculture,
quality supervision, industry and commerce and FDA for supervision and management of food safety”).
197
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and full process control . . . to establish a set of scientific and stringent
supervision and administration system.”198
In line with the “full process control” and scientific directions above,
the FSL requires the Chinese food safety supervision to be centralized at the
State Council. 199 The central government “shall govern the Food Safety
Committee,” 200 which consists of fifty-one experts 201 and functions to
coordinate, integrate, supervise, organize, manage, and promote the food
safety system involving the implementation of different departments at the
central and local levels.202 Additionally, the FSL establishes other committees
consisting of experts and representatives from “relevant departments” under
the central government. 203 These committees include the National Expert
Committee Food Safety Risk Assessment of forty-two members, which
carries out risk assessments;204 and the National Food Safety Standard Review
Committee, which formulates national food safety standards.205 As such, the
food safety administration shall be supervised and monitored by those experts
under the central authority.
In addition, the FSL clarifies the duties of different departments under
the State Council to enhance supervision with a more centralized
framework. 206 These agencies include the China Food and Drug
Administration (CFDA) that shall “supervise . . . food production and
distribution”;207 the National Health and Family Planning Commission that
198
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shall “organize the risk-monitoring and assessment,” “formulate and issue
national food safety standards” with the CFDA, 208 and “formulate and
implement national risk monitoring plans” with the CFDA and GAQSIQ;209
the Standardization Administration of China that shall “provide national
standard information”;210 and the Ministry of Agriculture that shall “exchange
risk monitoring information about the safety of food and Edible Agricultural
Products.”211 The Chinese food safety system, therefore, is centralized by the
State Council by products and functions.
The FSL also requires “centralized manner” and “centralized markets”
at the local level. Centralized manner, in particular, refers to “full-process
supervision and administration” that “shall lead, organize, and coordinate” to
“establish and improve the working and information-sharing mechanisms” at
different local regions.212 In light of this full-process supervisory order, local
administrations shall “encourage and support” small food workshops and
vendors “to . . . operate in fixed locations such as centralized markets or shops
. . . during a specified . . . period.”213 These requirements, thus, lead to greater
centralization at the local level as well.
Since 2009, regulations have been adopted regarding import and export
of toys, food, seafood, meat, and other products. An example is the Measures
for the Inspection, Supervision and Administration of Import and Export of
Toys (MIET), formulated by the GAQSIQ. 214 Under this measure, the
GAQSIQ supervises and administers toy exporters, toy enterprises involving
high-risk materials, as well as toy laboratories and recall systems.215 Under
the MIET, declaration statements from exporters are required to ensure that
the exported toys comply with the standards of importing countries.216 Similar
department regulations regarding import and export of seafood, meat, and
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other food were also formulated in 2011.217 These regulations emphasize the
role of agencies under public law, instead of merely relying on contracts under
private law.218
In line with this public law’s approach, the numbers of manufacturers
can be controlled and directed by agencies. For instance, in order to “restore
customer confidence and fend off foreign competition,” the Ministry of
Industry and Information Technology may reduce small domestic
manufacturers and nurture a few large Chinese dairy entities.219 Agencies may
also help large entities to increase market share, such as setting a goal to
achieve seventy percent in five years, to “seize control of the market and scoop
up smaller players.” 220 In light of this safety development, food and
merchandise production may be centralized in fewer enterprises, which can
be controlled and supervised by governments.
B.

Uniform and Unified Information

With respect to centralized information required by the TBT and SPS
Agreements, China has established WTO/TBT and WTO/SPS National
Enquiry Points (NEPs) located in the GAQSIQ. 221 These NEPs provide a
website, named WTO/TBT–SPS Notification and Enquiry of China,
www.tbtsps.com, which functions to answer enquiries regarding related
measures. 222 These NEPs allow the Chinese administration, associations,
enterprises, and individuals to communicate with WTO Members. 223
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jianyan jianyi jiandu guanli banfa (进出口肉类产品检验检疫监督管理办法) [Measures for the Supervision
and Administration of the Inspection and Quarantine of Imported and Exported Meat Products] [hereinafter
MIEMP] (promulgated by GAQSIQ, Mar. 10, 2010, effective June 1, 2011), CLI.4.144567 (Lawinfochina).
Exported product qualities must satisfy the standards of destination countries. MIEAP, art. 24. The
administrative supervision shall be in line with risk assessment and management. Id. art. 45.
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219
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Although the aim is to increase transparency regarding trade measures, this
development centralizes and unifies information at the national level.
In addition, the FSL explicitly obliges “unified manner,” “unified
planning,” “unified information,” and “unified publication.” 224 Unlike the
“uniform, impartial and reasonable manner” mandates in the WTO law, this
unification does not mention impartiality and reasonableness. Moreover,
“unified manner” shall be determined by the State Council, which applies to
catering service, cafeteria management, and the publication of food safety
information.225
The FSL also requires the State, the central government, to “establish a
unified information platform . . . and implement the unified publication
system of food safety information.”226 The “unified information” concerned,
in particular, involves “the national overall food safety, risk warning . . . major
food incidents and their investigation and handling, as well as other
information.” 227 Thus, no such information may be published without the
State Council’s authorization.228
What local departments, such as food and drug, quality supervision, and
agricultural administrations, may publish is mainly their routine supervision
and administrative matters. 229 The FSL prohibits any organization or
individual to “fabricate or disseminate false food safety information.”230 In
other words, until information is verified and authorized by the central
government, food safety issues may not be discussed, disclosed, or distributed
by local governments, organizations, and individuals. As such, food safety
information can be unified at both the local and central levels, under the
control of agencies and the Party.
C.

Greater Uniformity by Collective Responsibility

While WTO law emphasizes the preventive approach based on public
administrative regulations, China imposes collective responsibility on third
parties, as “related entities,” to establish a preventive system based on social
224
225
226
227
228
229
230
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surveillance. 231 Under the FSL, those potentially culpable entities include
“anyone who provides production or distribution premises or other conditions
for those engaging in the illegal acts.”232 In cases where consumers’ rights and
interests are damaged, these related entities, such as property owners, “shall,
together with producers and distributors . . . be held jointly and severally
liable.”233 The FSL, moreover, does not require these related entities to know
the illegal acts in question and does not define the term “other conditions.”234
As such, the boundary of related “third-party providers” may be extended to
ingredient and other suppliers, for instance, who may merely provide salt to
unsafe food producers. These suppliers can be held strictly and collectively
liable for the illegal acts committed by others.
Some related entities, such as consolidated trading market operators,
stall leasers, trade fair organizers, and online platform providers for food trade,
have explicitly imposed food safety responsibilities.235 These responsibilities
include reviewing food distributors’ licenses, specifying their management
responsibilities, and regularly inspecting their distribution environment and
conditions. 236 The online platform providers are specifically required to
implement real-name registration, as well as to stop illegal activities and
report to the food and drug administration at the county level.237
Collective responsibilities were firstly formulated in local regions, such
as Chongqing, in 2011. 238 By Chongqing’s local rules, related entities can be
industries, regions, distributors, and products that “relate” to food safety
incidents.239 Industrial collective responsibility can be imposed on a whole
supply chain including ingredient suppliers, producers, distributors, retailers,
231
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users, and services providers who knowingly supply storage, transportation,
or other facilities.240 Similar to the FSL, “related entities” are not necessarily
those that have committed violations. Merely having a connection to safety
incidents or violators may sufficiently lead to regulatory responsibilities and
sanctions.
By official reports, collective responsibility aims to promote selfregulation and self-governance. 241 Through the joint liability imposed on
related entities, the collective responsibility approach establishes a peersurveillance mechanism with the aim to monitor and direct the food industry
to self-regulate their production. Some also consider collective responsibility
as promoting “collective governance.” 242 Instead of solely relying on
administrations, food safety is governed by related sectors outside the food
industry. 243 This collective responsibility system, therefore, may also be
viewed as a preventive approach based on peer-surveillance to ensure
compliance and pursue uniformity.
D.

More Uniform Standards

Under the market economy and WTO law, increasing uniform
standards can be a competitive strategy in attracting foreign investment and
enhancing economic growth. The unifying development for international,
national, local, and private standards can be established through voluntary
measures, joint-ventured enterprises, and other commercial activities.
With respect to voluntary standards, 5,575 Chinese food enterprises
obtained International Organization for Standardization (ISO) certificates in
2011, which accounts for almost a third of the total number awarded in that
Chongqing tuichu shengchan jiagong huanjie shipin anquan “lianzuozhi” (重庆推出生产加工环
节食品安全”连坐制) [Chongqing Launches Food Safety Collective Responsibility System], XINHUA (Dec.
16, 2011), http://news.xinhuanet.com/2011-12/06/c_111221383.htm.
241
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year.244 Some reports show that China has the most ISO 9001 certificates of
management standard and ISO 14,001 certificates of environmental
management standard.245
In China, ISO certificates are issued by certification bodies that are
accredited by the China National Accreditation Service for Conformity
Assessment (CNAS). 246 The CNAS was founded in 2006 as “the national
accreditation body of China unitarily responsible for the accreditation bodies,
laboratories[,] and inspection bodies.”247 Established and authorized by the
Certification and Accreditation Administration, the mission of CNAS is to
“establish and operate the national accreditation system for conformity
assessment bodies.”248 As of April 2015, CNAS has created 135 certification
bodies, which have rendered over 840,000 certificates.249
Besides voluntary standards, different business models are established
to achieve international standards. One example is a wholesale supply model
to ensure food safety “from farm to fork” by METRO Cash & Carry China
(METRO China).250 A store providing wholesale and retail services, METRO
China assists farmers and food producers in improving production, processing,
packaging, and logistics management to comply with varied international
food safety standards such as the Global Good Agricultural Practice,
International Featured Standards,251 ISO 22000 standards,252 and the Hazard
Analysis and Critical Control Points system.253 This wholesale model helps to
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increase the competitiveness of small and medium-sized retailers.254 Along
with this process, international standards are being adopted through connected
operation between farmers, processors, wholesalers, and retailers. This model
seems to be growing in China.255
In addition, there is a trend of importing not only foreign products but
also corporations through joint ventures and integration. For instance, due to
the melamine-tainted milk scandal and growing domestic demand, imported
dairy products increased from 120,000 tons in 2008 to 600,000 tons in 2009,
is estimated to reach 14.2 million metric tons in 2017, and expected to exceed
19 million metric tons in 2026.256 To improve the quality, dairy companies set
up their own farms instead of collecting raw milk from small farmers. 257
Moreover, joint venture enterprises were established with foreign dairy
corporations from France, New Zealand, and Switzerland, among others.258
As a result, international production and management standards were adopted
to achieve greater uniformity.
Uniform standards can also be achieved by quality training conducted
by foreign administrations and corporations. After the toy safety crisis,
Chinese agencies sponsored training courses for manufacturers and regulators
254
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assist two million independent retailers that are facing intense competition. The support provided includes
analyzing strengths, locating target customers, suggesting products, and supplying quality products at
competitive prices. Statistics show that this support solution increases smaller retailers' sales by 40%. Id.
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led by American and European experts, who are representatives from private
sector companies, such as Mattel, as well as foreign administrations, such as
the U.S. Food and Drug Administration (U.S. FDA).259 For instance, under
the U.S. FDA – AQSIQ China, Agreement on the Safety of Food and Feed,
the U.S. FDA may conduct inspections of covered food products in China
without providing notice in advance.260 Chinese manufacturers, therefore, are
not only subject to the unified supervision of the Chinese administration but
also foreign authorities.
Reviewing the food and product safety development, China is moving
towards greater uniformity and centralization under the “full process control.”
As discussed, this control involves strengthening the administrative and
supervisory power of the central government, unifying information, imposing
collective responsibility, as well as adopting more international standards
voluntarily as a market strategy to increase competitiveness. This process,
however, seems to be enhancing the economic power of the communist
administration, and it is unclear if the food and product safety problem can be
solved.
Considering the administrative and supervisory power of the Chinese
governance, food and product safety statutes require a more centralized
framework within an internal system. 261 In the name of safety, the State
Council supervises and monitors food and product production at both the
central and local levels. The rules applied, moreover, are not bound by a rule
of law framework that emphasizes external checks and balances, impartiality,
and reasonableness.262 This greater administrative power to monitor economic
activities, therefore, can also be a move backward, as it enhances the control
of the Party.263
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As stated, this internal regulatory framework does not have independent
media of a public reporting system.264 Together with the “strictest” control of
food safety, the central government shall supervise and determine the “unified
manner,” “unified planning,” “unified information,” and “unified publication.”
What the public is more likely to see are those reports providing unified
positive views, such as showing: “96.8 percent of [food] samples met
standards in 2015,” “fake baby formula met national safety standards,”265 and
“authorities across China received 1.03 million reports regarding food and
drug safety from the public” to announce the administration is working hard,
and Chinese food and products are safe.266 People might not know whether
these positive stories are true. A CFDA survey in 2015 showed that “nearly
seventy-five percent of respondents did not have any or enough confidence in
domestic food safety.”267 “Online rumors,” therefore, spread continuously.268
In light of this internal system, the preventive approach relying on
collective responsibility can also be ineffective, especially when wrongdoers
can be related to governing administrations. For instance, Sanlu, the formula
maker that caused the food safety crisis, was a state-owned enterprise
governed by officials. 269 Under the market policy, Chinese officials are
legislators, law interpreters, administrators, regulators, as well as business
developers with the duty to achieve economic growth. 270 Significant
enterprises, directly or indirectly, associate with governments or the Party.271
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The Chinese preventive approach, therefore, still emphasizes self-regulation
and self-governance, which is not subject to any independent or external
scrutiny.
This self-governing safety development, moreover, is not necessarily
driven by mandatory regulations nor consistent with the WTO law. Although
China has adopted more international standards, this improvement can be
made voluntarily to attract foreign investment and to improve market access.
Besides, those adopted standards may cover stricter standards required by
private international corporations.272 Considering that the WTO law aims to
avoid unnecessary trade barriers among Members, the “international
standards” adopted by China’s enterprises can still be controlled by private
corporations and supervised by the Party to secure their economic power.273
V.

CONCLUSION

This paper examines the impact of the WTO law on China’s food and
product safety development regarding uniformity and centralization. This
study observes that although the WTO Agreements emphasize free trade to
pursue non-discriminatory treatment and to eliminate trade barriers, the
transparency and harmonization process can be used and directed to an
opposite end: the enhancement of the economic power of the Party.
Considering the transparency principle, the GATT highlights the
“uniform, impartial and reasonable manner” of rule application, and the China
Protocol underscores “uniform administration” regarding trade measures.
When international food and product safety is involved, the TBT and SPS
Agreements extend further to preempt and harmonize substantive regulations.
In light of these agreements, a vertical governing structure with centralized
settings has been established, and is expected to create greater uniformity.
This uniformity and centralization, nevertheless, seems to be
inconsistent with the Chinese regulatory system. This system has a highly
decentralized, non-uniform structure depending on private law and ex post
remedies. Without the rule of law framework, the new development mainly
embraces a unified and centralized manner regarding information, and a
preventive approach encouraging peer-surveillance. Although more
international standards can be adopted voluntarily, this framework trusts and
272
273
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promotes internal self-regulation. Media shall be controlled. Safety reports
shall be positive. No one shall speak up without authorization.
Thus, although the WTO law aims to encourage free trade and fair
treatment to pursue greater consistency, predictability, and certainty of the
rule of law, China’s embrace of the WTO can instead be used to consolidate
their internal governance control. In association with international
corporations, exported Chinese food and product safety may still be ensured
by the assessments conducted by importing countries. Domestic Chinese food
and product safety, however, must be overseen by the Party. This leader, the
Party, has the “full process control” over political, economic, judicial, and
administrative powers over thoughts and expression. A unifying voice from
the central government and echoed by local administrations: Chinese food and
products are safe.

